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“Give me a high-speed rail station,
or nothing!” How private
stakeholders consider investing in
the high-speed rail station’s area in
shrinking cities
The case of Saint-Étienne (France)
« Une gare TGV sinon rien ! ». Quartiers de gare TGV et promotion immobilière
dans des villes en décroissance. L’exemple de Saint-Etienne
Aurélie Delage
 
Introduction: high-speed rail stations as a spur to
dynamism in shrinking cities?
1 Over the last decade, numerous cities in France and in Europe have engaged in urban
regeneration projects in the area around their central station. Regardless their size, those
aspirant European-class cities all strove hard to get a high-speed rail (HSR) stop and then
implement an ambitious project to facelift the area around the station. The new HSR
station area is meant to showcase the dynamism of the whole city. These projects include
office  and  service-oriented  buildings,  functional  mixing,  social  mix  and  iconic
architecture,  which  are  commonplace  features  of  a  consensual  urban  project.  While
addressing urban blight, the aim of those cities is twofold: to be more attractive in the
competition between European cities, and to curb urban sprawl and thus comply with
sustainable development requirements by increasing the population density in the area
surrounding a reinforced transportation hub.
2 One may argue though that this strategy is certainly relevant for large cities, but that it
may be oversized for second- and third-tier cities, whose ability to reach the level of a
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global city is less obvious (e.g., Saint-Etienne, France). However, it is in those very cities
that this kind of project seems to be the most desirable and to raise hope in a bright
future among local authorities. Indeed, local representatives still strongly believe that an
infrastructure  is  a  lever  for  local  development  (Offner,  2014),  even  if  it  has  been
extensively covered (cf. literature review by Bazin et al., 2011) and debated (Controverses
de l’Espace Géographique, 2014) that these benefits are far from being proved (Offner, 1993;
Plassard, 1997; Joignaux, 1997, etc.).  When the arrival of a high-speed train has some
effects,  it  is in combination with other factors and those effects are of various kinds
according to the region taken into account (Delaplace, 2012), they are differential (Chen
and Hall, 2012) or have to be considered on the long run (Bretagnolle, 2014). Nonetheless,
this belief is so deeply rooted that it still appears as a genuine spur for public action
(Beaucire, 2014), as suggests the proliferation of urban projects: it contributes to focusing
public investment on a deprived area of the city (Delage, 2013) and designing a regional
strategy1 (Frémont, 2014). As a first step to the upgrading of the area, the HSR station is
generally  turned  into  a  multimodal  transportation  hub  to  improve  the  connection
between local and regional mass transit networks (Menerault (dir.), 2006).
3 Most  of  the  research works  about  the  relationship  between HSR stations  and urban
development  have  focused  on  public  actors’  strategies  in  major  cities  (Troin,  1997;
Ollivro, 1999; Menerault, Barre (dir.), 2001; Facchinetti-Mannone, Bavoux, 2010; Bellet et
al., 2012; Delage, 2013) and more recently in smaller cities (Facchinetti-Manonne et al.,
2013;  Roudier,  2015).  Most of those research works agree on the HSR station being a
“spearhead of a long-term, public,  sector-led spatial  strategy with deliberate regional
planning designed to magnify and spread economic and regeneration benefits” (Brown
and al., 2013, p 115), especially in France. But little is said about private stakeholders’
point of view. Studies led by the Laboratoire d’Économie des Transports2 in the mid-1980s
to assess the effect of the new French HSR service between Lyons and Paris underlined
that for private stakeholders, the HSR was “a bonus” (Bonnafous, 1987). More recently,
research works about Rheims Clairmarais revealed that private companies would choose
to come to Clairmarais less because of the presence of the new HSR service than thanks to
the actual presence of modern office buildings in the area (Bazin et al., 2009)3. In both
cases,  the  private  stakeholders  covered  by  the  scope  of  the  analysis  are  private
companies, i.e. end-users. More has to be known about real estate developers, the actors
who actually build the new HSR area prior to the arrival of end-users. In Rheims, recent
research works  showed that  HSR was  an “additional  location factor”  for  developers,
combined with other  transportation amenities  and a  strong public-led urban project
(Bazin et al., 2016). But the HSR is taken as a whole, and what precisely is attractive to
developers remains unaddressed. This paper proposes to bridge this gap by focusing on
the real estate developers engaging in a programme near an HSR station, and unfolding
the many aspects of an HSR station. It proposes a new approach of the link between real
estate and HSR: unlike many quantitative research works that focus on the effect of the
HSR on real estate markets (Bazin et al., 2010) and land values (for instance using the
hedonic approach, Mayor et al., 2008; Debrezion et al., 2011), this paper aims at qualifying
the role played by the HSR in the decision making process of real estate developers.
4 Our analytical framework encompasses the challenges of urban regeneration in historic
central  station  areas.  It  appears  that  there  is  a  set  of  constraints  that  real  estate
developers have to deal with. As a go-between between banks, public-sector customers
and  end-users,  most  of  real  estate  developers  have  to  come  to  a  compromise  on
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(contradictory) constraints. On the one hand, they have to design a tailored programme
to meet the needs of a specific place. When railway station areas are concerned, the cost
of the works may be higher because the former presence of industries next to the station
generates expensive depolluting processes. On the other hand, real-estate developers are
dependent on banks and investors  (especially  as  far as  office building is  concerned),
whose rules of conduct are driven by risk-limiting strategies (Lorrain, 2011): they must
meet the requirements for profitability and security that prevail in the financial world –
which  may  lead  to  some  standardized  risk-limiting  solution.  As  “anchoring”  actors4
(Theurillat et al., 2014), real estate developers then take part to the increasing role of
finance in the building of the city (Renard, 2008; Baraud-Serfaty, 2008, 2009).
5 Limiting risk often means investing in so-called “secure” places – namely, in the most
desirable  (economically,  culturally  dynamic)  cities,  and  in  the  most  desirable
neighbourhoods (especially historic city centres)  – hence a fierce competition among
cities in a globalized world and a high spatial selectivity to the detriment of less attractive
areas. This spatial selectivity has been even higher in the last past years because of the
financial crisis. As a consequence, private stakeholders are more and more reluctant to
invest  in  so-called “risky places”.  Their  action is  thus driven to a  greater  extent  by
prudential rules of risk-limiting, meaning restricting the choice of potential investment
fields and areas to already attractive ones.
6 This raises the following question: how does real estate development take place in “less-
attractive”  cities  where  the  market  forces  are  too  weak  to  make  the  investment  as
profitable as in a regular place, and where there is no public direct subsidy to appeal to
private investors? Our hypothesis is that the high-speed rail station does help to attract
real estate developers in those supposedly risky cities. In the same way the HSR station is
a spur for public-led ambitious projects; it may influence the way real estate developers
take action. Academic economics and regional sciences handbooks tell us that the HSR
station is a top-list feature to define a prime location5 in the real estate world, especially
for office buildings (MacDonald and MacMillen, 2010, among others). This overall high
desirability of the HSR station is confirmed by the recurrence of urban projects based on
a new business district next to a new HSR station6: is this rule still valid in post-industrial
medium-size cities such as Saint-Etienne?
7 This paper aims at unfolding what precisely in the HSR station is attractive to market-
driven stakeholders as real-estate developers: is it the station itself as a transportation
hub,  or  the  station  area’s  urban  features  (since  train  station  areas  traditionally  are
districts with a specific and ambiguous7 identity in the city, Kokoreff, 2002)? To which
extent does this node-place ambivalence (Bertolini, 1998a et b) help them to offset the
risks taken in non-attractive cities?
8 To address this issue, our methodology is qualitative and inductive, based upon the case
study of Saint-Etienne Châteaucreux in France. Saint-Etienne is a former industrial city
that is considered as a shrinking city (Wolff et al., 2013; Cunningham-Sabot, Roth, 2014),
even a “loser city”8 (Rousseau, 2008) in a globalized world. The TGV9 (brand of the French
national railway’s high-speed rail) arrived in the city as early as 1981, at the moment
when the first high-speed rail system was built between Paris and Lyons, France’s third
largest city – the TGV runs then at a regular speed between Lyons and Saint-Etienne
though10.  Hence,  this  case  study  helps  to  single  out  the  effect  of  the  TGV  as  the
significantly faster means of transport and as a brand over three decades in one of the
first cities connected to the high-speed rail system. However, if any effect is to be proven,
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one will have to question why this effect occurred two decades after the city was being
served by the TGV.
9 As part of a four-year fieldwork in Saint-Etienne (2008-2012), I interviewed each of the
five  real  estate  developers11 who had a  programme being  built  or  about  to  be  built
between 2010 and 201212. This fieldwork was completed by a few other semi-structured
interviews with professionals having an overview of the real estate industry (including
real  estate  agents)13.  Most  of  those  real-estate  developers’  programmes  were  in  the
middle of  the building process:  that should minimize the risk of  memory lapses,  but
cannot prevent the risk of ex post facto explanations, as the real estate developers all had
won the bid a few months before. I then cross-referenced the interviews and professional
reports. This extensive research work was recently updated thanks to a press review, the
monitoring of specific websites14 and a small number of targeted interviews (June 2016).
10 To understand how real estate developers decided to engage in a programme in Saint-
Etienne Châteaucreux despite the overall bad reputation of the city, this paper will first
display a few facts and figures about the city, its real estate market and the real estate
developers who are building the new buildings in Châteaucreux. Then, the analysis of the
arguments  and  motivations  of  those  developers  will  help  to  assess  the  role  and
importance of the HSR station in their decision.
 
Real estate developers in Saint-Etienne Châteaucreux,
an overview
The Rise and Fall of Saint-Etienne: the making of a specific context
11 Saint-Etienne is located in the “Région Rhône-Alpes”, the second wealthiest region in
France after Île-de-France (where Paris is), only 60 km from its capital city, Lyons. Despite
this dynamic regional context, Saint-Etienne epitomises former coal mine and industrial
cities that dramatically suffered from deindustrialisation during the last quarter of the 20
th century. A boom town in the 19 th century, Saint-Etienne had a flourishing industry
based on firearms, guns and bikes. The city hosted a royal manufacture and long had a
strong relationship with the French central  State that provided orders.  Correlatively,
local authorities long had few political power and very little interest in urban design
(Bayon,  2001).  When  deindustrialisation  hit  the  region,  they  went  on  focusing  on
economic matters to the detriment of urban planning, and heavily relying on central
State subsidies (Verney-Caron, 1999; Béal et al. 2010).
12 It changed in the late 1990s when the census revealed the city was still losing population
(-20 000 inhabitants in the last decade, i.e. almost one inhabitant out of ten15), especially
young adults and skilled people (Masboungi, de Graveleine, 2005). These figures have to
be viewed in the context of a city where households’ income was significantly lower than
the regional and national averages, and where unemployment was higher than in the rest
of the country16. The new mayor (M. Thiollière) then decided to put on the agenda urban
regeneration as a top-list priority in order to stop the shrinking of the city and regain
some attractiveness. Saint-Etienne implemented a new urban marketing strategy to get
rid of the sticky pejorative image of a literally “black” city – Saint-Etienne is actually a
late-follower  of  this  reimaging  strategy  many  cities  had  already  implemented
(Cunningham-Sabot, Roth, 2014). The local authorities chose to build their new image on
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design  and  creative  classes  (Rousseau,  2008;  Sechi,  2016)17.  They  quickly  engaged  in
several  urban  projects  to  move  forward  and  upgrade  the  amenities  of  the  city.  For
instance,  a  new show venue (“Zenith”)  was  ordered to  Sir  Norman Forster,  and the
Imperial Arms Factory was refurbished as a “Design Village” to host exhibitions such as
the International Design Biennale (Zanetti, 2011).
13 The  decision  to  facelift  the  railway  station  area  is  part  of  this  new urban planning
strategy. Actually, the arrival of the high-speed rail had not been anticipated by local
authorities in the early 1980s, maybe because at that time the city was dealing with a
severe industrial crisis. It is not until the mid-1980s that the idea of a business district
arose. A study for the deputy mayor in charge of urban planning (M. Thiollière) proposed
to redesign the station plaza and to add some office buildings in the vicinity of the train
station to take advantage of the new TGV service (1986). But the economic crisis of the
1990s was a strong impediment to take any action. The same idea came back in the late
1990s, and was implemented in many steps, thanks to proactive political support and
both local and national public investment. A 60-hectare development zone was created in
200718,  after a public agency (Établissement Public d’Aménagement,  EPA19)  was created to
design and implement the masterplan of the area (Figures 1 and 2).
 
Figure 1. Saint-Etienne Châteaucreux in its urban context.
Source: EPASE and A. Delage, 2016
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Figure 2. Urban regeneration programme around Saint-Etienne Châteaucreux HSR station.
Source: A. Delage, 2016
 
Facing one of the weakest real estate market in France
14 Taking action in Saint-Etienne is especially challenging for both public and private actors
since the former cannot rely on abundant funding and the latter cannot rely on a strong
land market that would be able to sustain the renewal of the city. When the urban project
was engaged (prior to the 2008 crisis), the city actually had one of the France’s weakest
land markets20. The prices in Saint-Etienne were on average significantly lower than in
the other major cities of the Rhône-Alpes region (see Table 1).
 
Table 1: Saint-Etienne, a weak real estate market (2009)21.
15 However, these figures should be considered with caution since there is in Saint-Etienne
quite a big gap between old-stone and new housing units’ prices, and between belt-line
districts  (less  than  700  €/m²  in  2009)  and  central  districts  with  some  architectural
heritage. The residential real estate market is low mainly because of the poverty of the
population living in Saint-Etienne. In the 1970s, the middle classes left the city centre to
buy  a  house  in  the  hilly  suburbs.  Contrary  to  most  of  French  and  European  cities,
gentrification  of  the  historic  core  in  Saint-Etienne  is  quite  limited  (Rousseau,  2008;
Cunningham-Sabot,  Roth,  2014)  and  the  vacancy  rate  is  rather  high  (10,4%22).  As  a
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consequence, the price of housing units, both to sale and to rent, is lower than in Lyons or
Grenoble (another major city of the Rhône-Alpes Region)23.
16 The  commercial  real  estate  market  is  low  as  well.  The  offer  was  not  matching  the
demand, mainly because available offices were for rent when the demand was actually to
buy them24. Also, the offices were scattered in the metro area. In the late 2000s, the prices
were lower in Saint-Etienne (130-150 €/m²) than in Lyons Part-Dieu (230-250 €/m²)25 –
this  price gap was exactly  the argument put  forward by real  estate agents  in Saint-
Etienne (see below). In 2014, the price gap between Lyons and Saint-Etienne remains the
same: a prime location is priced 180 €/m² in Châteaucreux, 270 €/m² in Lyons Part-Dieu
(250 €/m² in Marseille, 190 €/m² in Nantes, to be compared to 745 €/m² in Paris)26.
17 On top of that, real estate developers and real estate agents were unanimous that the city
has a bad reputation as a weak market. As a consequence, some real estate developers
even “blacklisted” the city because they considered that engaging in a programme there
was too risky to be profitable27.
 
National real estate developers are rebuilding Châteaucreux
18 Despite the very poor reputation of Saint-Etienne, some developers accepted to invest in
the city mostly thanks to the initiatives taken by public actors (the municipality and then
the EPA). Table 2 reviews the real estate developers and investors that have been or are
currently  leading  a  property  programme  in  Saint-Etienne  Châteaucreux.  The
redevelopment zone is meant to develop 160 000 m² of new housing units, and 200 000 m²
of new office space by 2020.
 
Table 2. Comparison of the programmes led in the Châteaucreux area. 
Source: EPASE + interviews by the author (2008-2016)
Information gathered by the author, as of June 2016
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19 First, unlike in Rheims (Bazin et al., 2009), all of the developers but one are national real
estate developers. Four of them are listed on the French Stock Exchange: Bouygues
(actually involved in three programmes through two of its branches) and Vinci are global
players in construction and services when Altarea is a property group and BNP Paribas
Real Estate is a branch of one of the major French banks. Then, Art de Construire and
Cardinal Group28 are nationwide real estate developers with their headquarters in Lyons;
they are  not  listed on the French Stock exchange.  Only  one developer  is  local:  it  is
actually  an  architect  who  eventually  engaged  in  real  estate  development  for  that
programme only (thus being quite an exception in this overview). However, this local
developer also cooperates with a national developer specialised in social housing. In other
words,  when  using  Theurillat  and  al’s  categories:  four  developers  belong  to  the
“financialised” real estate capitalism, two belong to the market category and the last one
is between self-development and market oriented development (Theurillat et al., 2015).
20 As  for  the  investors,  the  available  information  shows  tighter  relationships  with  the
financial  sphere when office  buildings  are  concerned:  Foncière INEA is  a  Real  Estate
Investment Trust specialised in new office buildings outside of Paris, whereas Heeuricap
is  an  investment  vehicle partly  held  by  the  Bouygues  Group  (nine-year  lease)  –
surprisingly, the Casino Group does not own its headquarters building when it has two
real estate companies (Mercyalis and Immobilière Groupe Casino). But there are some
exceptions,  especially in the Luminis  programme where Saint-Etienne Métropole,  the
intercommunal body, owns a part of the building: this actually reveals the difficulties
Altarea encountered to sell this programme, as the public authorities eventually decided
to buy their premises not to jeopardise the building of what was designed as the flagship
building of the area.
21 The presence of major companies can be explained by the very nature of the programmes
implemented around a station. Most of them are rather large office buildings that require
some high technical  knowledge and some human capacity to complete the large and
complex construction work within a reasonable time (once the amount of presold offices
or housing units has secured the programme). Hence big companies tend to be more
competitive to win tenders.  Moreover,  in those flagship projects,  the client implicitly
often demands an iconic and/or striking architecture, preferably designed by a world-
class architect29. Not only is it supposed to ease the selling of the building, but also it is
intended to benefit to the general image of the city. A national company is thus more
likely than a local company not only to comply with the ambition of the project but also
to have those architects in its address book. For instance, the iconic yellow Luminis was
designed by award-winning Manuelle  Gautrand,  the future Îlot  Poste  Weiss  was  first
designed by Pritzker Prize awarded Jean Nouvel30, and the Îlot F is designed by renowned
Nicolas Michelin. As a consequence, this attraction for “starchitects” imposes an extra
pressure on local architects and developers – the local architect I interviewed told me
that he was not disadvantaged by a supposedly lack of proficiency nor because of the
flatness of his proposals but by a lack of notoriety.
 
Is a handful of developers routinizing the regeneration of
Châteaucreux?
22 A further analysis of the characteristics of those developers highlights that most of them
are not first-timers in Châteaucreux nor in Saint-Etienne.
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23 First,  some of  them tendered for  many projects  without  winning the  bid:  they kept
tendering with the hope they could eventually win and thus get some investment return
– both financial and time investment. This is how Cirmad won the CESU bid, after three
unsuccessful attempts31.
24 Then, when a programme has already been completed in Châteaucreux by a developer
(Cirmad, BNP Paribas) or in Saint-Etienne (BNP-Paribas32), it means that this developer
has some knowledge of the characteristics of the market, and found ways to circumvent
the weakness of the market – for example by orienting it towards a larger size so that the
programme would be large enough to cover the fixed costs (Cap City), or by creating a
joint-venture with a social landlord (White Carbon, Medic Centre).
25 In the case of BNP-Paribas Real Estate, being a branch of a major bank also helps to sell
housing units  to investors,  thanks to the network of  bank advisors in bank agencies
throughout the country. Those bank advisors may entice their clients into investing in
housing units and thus taking advantage of temporary tax exemption programmes, such
as the so-called Scellier Scheme (“Dispositif Scellier”) offering people who buy housing
units  only  to  rent  them  to  get  a  tax  relief  during  nine  years  and  to  which  the
Châteaucreux area qualified33.
26 These strategies exposed in 2010-2012 by the real estate developers during the interviews
are confirmed by the recent moves within Châteaucreux. Over the last two years, three
new property programmes have been launched: all of them are led by developers who
already completed a programme in Châteaucreux in the last past years. The Medic Centre
is developed by Bouygues Immobilier – which is arguably linked in some way with the
fact that one of the Bouygues branches, Cirmad, completed the CN-CESU in 2012 and
comes back to Châteaucreux to build the “Îlot F”. As for the former Casino Headquarters
(22/24 rue de la Montat), the main partner is Vinci, already involved in the “Îlot Poste-
Weiss”.
27 Real estate developers thus seem to follow a sort of routine34, coming back to the same
places: this may indicate that a relationship of trust and reliability has been built between
the developers and the EPA35, which helps to offset the initial risk taken when engaging a
new programme in Saint-Etienne. As shown in other public agency-led mega-projects, the
EPA and the elected officials play an important role to attract and negotiate with real
estate developers or investors (Bertoncello, Dubois, 2010; Delage, 2013). The real estate
developers  I  met  almost  all  acknowledged  the  EPA  for  being  a  unique  public
representative, thus facilitating the process. They clearly highlighted how reassuring this
public actor was for them36, especially when the EPA was bringing a unique end-user such
as the CESU37 or phasing the launching of  programmes not  to have too many offers
available at the same time.
28 This overview thus brings to light the fact that most of the real estate developers at work
in Châteaucreux are totally embedded in the financial system and have to comply with
the risk-limiting rules of global finance. As the mental maps they designed of the area
clearly show38, they also may have limited knowledge of the local characteristics – their
office being in Lyons, they may commute only to visit their construction site. But when
they  are  developing  a  second  programme,  they  presumably  capitalize  on  their  first
experience and deepen their knowledge of the area.
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29 The  next  section  investigates  whether,  considering  their  initial  weak  link  with
Châteaucreux, developers chose this location for the area characteristics, the HSR as a
whole, or specific features of the HSR station. 
 
Real estate developers and the HSR station: from use
value to exchange value
30 Public authorities  designed the new district  to be built  next  to the HSR station as a
business/service-oriented  district  –  as  some  of  them implicitly  admitted,  they  copy-
pasted what  was  implemented in  larger  cities  in  order  Saint-Etienne not  to  be  “left
behind” 39.  Their original  goal  was to compete with Lyons Part-Dieu,  France’s second
largest CBD after Paris-La Défense. Their argument was to say that a 40-minute train ride
would enable companies to afford larger and more up-to-date offices as the prices would
be lower in Saint-Etienne than in Lyons. As a matter of fact this argument found some
echo among the real estate developers I interviewed. Four out of five agreed that if the
Châteaucreux station had not been serviced by a high-speed train, they would not have
considered a programme in this area as an option at all.  They actually rely on their
experience in other (larger) cities and build the following equation up: “business district =
TGV station district”. However we acknowledge this argument is more a belief than a
proven fact, as the following paragraphs show.
31 What, precisely, in the station is attractive to real estate developers when deciding to bid
on  a  public  call  for  tenders  in  Châteaucreux?  There  are  two  sets  of  answers,  both
matching with the node-place model established by Bertolini (1996): factors related to the
transportation infrastructure itself, and factors related to its position in the city fabric.
 
The transportation-related arguments
32 When asked what precisely in the TGV station was so crucial, the real estate developers
all said the accessibility was a prime argument to define the value of a plot of land. Not
only the TGV is a direct link to Paris, but also the many TER (regional express trains) are a
commuting facility with Lyons. Comparing TGV and TER services highlights that the TER
service is the actual major asset of the station (Table 3) thanks the introduction of the
fixed-interval timetable (as frequently as every 10 minutes at rush hours). In comparison,
the TGV has a limited service: it is not running at a high speed between Lyons and Saint-
Etienne, it has only 4 trains (round trip) a day and connects Saint-Etienne to a limited
number of destinations, being a dead-end station (Figure 3).
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Table 3. Regional and high-speed train service at Châteaucreux station, as of September 2015.
Data collected by the author, from the SNCF and TER websites
 
Figure 3. The 2015 France’s HSR network.
Source: adapted from Wikipedia Commons
33 However, real estate developers consider the TGV as an asset for business purpose, as it
provides a direct service to Paris, the capital city of a still monocentric France. The first
train arrives in Paris at 9 am and the last train leaves Paris at 7 pm: it allows a round-trip
journey on the same day, which saves the additional cost of a night in a hotel. Conversely,
the first train from Paris arrives in Saint-Etienne before 10 am and the last train leaves
Châteaucreux station after 6 pm, which also enables a round trip journey on a day from
Paris. From a business point of view, the high-speed connectivity then makes up for the
distance,  as  it  provides  a  direct  and  rather  fast  service  between  Saint-Etienne  and
France’s major financial centre.
34 Besides the train station, the multimodal hub is also appealing to real estate developers,
especially  from a  resident’s  or  a  visitor’s  point  of  view.  They  all  pay  tribute  to  the
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improvement of the overall connectivity of the train station to the rest of the city bus
network –  they thus  appreciate  the action taken by public  stakeholders  a  few years
before. When the decision was made to regenerate the area, transportation experts put
into the light the fact that the central train station was not well connected to the city’s
major places.  The urban bus map actually needed a substantial  overhaul  to turn the
central station into a major local transportation node. As a result, Châteaucreux station is
now the main hub in the metro area, where a light-train line, major city bus lines, and
regional bus lines are all connected (see Figure 2). This is a great asset for both office and
residential buildings, as customers or residents are likely to use mass transit to go to
work (if their office is in the Châteaucreux area) or go back home (if they live in the
Châteaucreux area).
35 However, the real estate developers’ discourse about connectivity may be paradoxical, or
may vary according to their targets. They typically tend to emphasize the (admittedly
poor) TGV service and minimize the genuine transportation asset of the station, i.e. the
TER (the TER service between Saint-Etienne and Lyons is close to the standard of the
express commuting system in the Greater Paris,  namely the RER).  Indeed,  since high
speed is  often associated with the  myth of  modernity  (Klein,  2001;  Belot,  2015),  the
symbolic value of the TGV is higher than the TER’s: the TGV passenger is often associated
with the image of the modern business man when the TER passenger is not. Regarding the
investors’ rationales, the TGV is also a kind of universal reference. One of the real estate
developers explained us how difficult it was to draw international investors’ attention
over programmes in Saint-Etienne. As he put it, either they do not know Saint-Etienne
and they are reluctant to consider it as an option, or they know little about the city
(mostly the clichés of a “black city”) and they are reluctant to engage action in a city with
such a poor reputation. In both cases they refuse to take any risk by investing there. But,
in the course of the negotiation, as the real estate developer unfolds the characteristics of
the programme he is in charge of,  mentioning the TGV will  raise the interest of the
investor40.  That  is  because,  even if  he  is  not  from the  region,  nor  from France,  the
investor will certainly know what a TGV is, and most of the time will associate it with a
business district. It seems that the branding effect of the TGV – quite obvious in Saint-
Etienne in so long as there is no high-speed service until Lyons – must not be minimized
when  foreign  investors  are  concerned.  As  another  real  estate  developer  put  it,  the
investors know very little about France: they would be able to mention Paris of course,
the French Riviera most of the time, perhaps Lyons41. Correlatively they are more likely to
invest in places they know than in less known – and less prestigious – places such as
Saint-Etienne. In other words, the less an investor knows a place, the unlikeliest he is to
invest in it. As a consequence, the TGV brings some familiar colour to a city that is not
familiar to the investor. Even if representations are not the only driving forces to make a
decision, it is quite obvious that the mental images and the mental maps are still crucial
in the process. They play a role that is important – hard to measure though. Those mental
images are spreading through the real estate world and eventually become a doxa, that is
to say some statements that are taken for granted by the real estate developers and the
investors, no matter they are true ones or misconceptions. As such, these common beliefs
potentially play a role in decision making.
36 The top-list quality of the HSR station thus lies in its connectivity to Paris, but the TGV
(outside a high-speed line) is a two-side asset. The TGV certainly has a prime branding
effect on decision making from a real-estate developer’s (and investor’s) point of view. It
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is part of an international standard. But its actual value comes from the connection it
provides with places at national (TGV), regional (TER) and local (buses) scales, which is an
asset from a user’s point of view.
 
The urbanity-related arguments
37 When asked about other reasons why they came to Châteaucreux, real estate developers
identify another set of arguments, related to the urban characteristics of the area.
38 First, they all put a major emphasis on the address of their building. It is important to
them to be immediately highly visible from the station when the business man is exiting
the station concourse, which means the building is easy to see, easy to find (which avoids
a loss of time). Prime locations are located in the streets with direct access to the station
plaza (cf. Figure 2). It is important that the building’s address is well known, especially
when the street has a name as prestigious as “Esplanade de France”, which might refer to
the “Esplanade” (large plaza) in the heart of la Défense (Paris’ Central Business District).
39 Second,  they  also  value  the  proximity  of  the  city  centre  and  its  many  shops  and
restaurants. Office employees might want to go shopping during their lunch time: they
will be able to do so within a ten-minute walk or a five-minute ride. Residents might also
seek the urban thriving lifestyle within walking distance. Those urban characteristics are
a legacy of urban history: when train stations were built in the 19th century, they were
built on the outskirts of the then urban core. Afterwards, they were embedded in the
urban fabric when cities grew at a fast pace. As a consequence, the central stations now
take advantage of the historic centre’s proximity, all the more since city centres have
been desirable again for a few years (Bidou-Zachariasen, 2003).
40 Last but not least, as a former industrial district, the central station area provides not
only  a  big  amount  of  available  land  (former  industrial  wastelands),  but  also  large
tenements, which facilitates large – and possibly more profitable developments.
 
A multi-facetted asset: the high-speed rail station as an all-risk
insurance
41 As  the  previous  sections  show,  the  real  estate  developers  put  forward  a  number  of
arguments where the HSR station plays direct and indirect roles in the choices they make
(those arguments echo the ones put forward by the investors and the bankers, as they
said during the interviews). The HSR is thus necessary to engage in a programme in such
a weak market as Saint-Etienne. Not only does the station provide excellent connectivity
assets,  but also some urban assets.  It  is connecting local,  regional and national scale,
which increases the value of the land that is available in large tenements close to the city
centre (see Figure 4).  If  accessibility is  always put as a top-list  argument,  real  estate
developers  actually  do not  need to  make a  hierarchy of  these  elements,  since  those
features are inextricably linked in a central HSR station area, by the very nature and
history of it.
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Figure 4. A multi-facetted object, the high-speed rail station as an all-risk insurance.
Made by the author
42 This wide array of assets provided by the HSR station and its area is exactly what brings
some reassuring arguments to real-estate developers (and investors). In the same way
Veltz (1996) showed how the diversity of skilled professionals and of potential activities
or outlets provided an all-risk insurance to companies located in global cities, we could
say that the centrally-located HSR station provides an all-risk insurance to real-estate
developers thanks to its many potential uses. This can be true not only because of the
variety of assets the HSR station has, but also because it can be called up at various steps
of the property programme decision process.
43 First, the more assets the place provides, the likelier the people will consider the place as
a profitable investment or a potential place to move in. In the same way the high-speed
rail station physically connects many spatial scales, it also connects stakeholders from
many decision-making scales (end-users, bankers, foreign investors, etc.). It is then an
excellent  means  to  align  the  action  of  place-based  and  place-less  (market-driven)
stakeholders with whom real estate developers have to deal with42. In other words, at
least one of the various angles of the HSR station may speak to each stakeholder – either
the actual use value of  the station,  especially  for  commuters,  or  the exchange value
provided by the branding effect of the TGV for the globalized investors.
44 Second, when the HSR station helps to convince the different stakeholders of a property
programme, it actually makes easier each step of the implementation of the project. The
HSR station first helps to attract real estate developers to consider the area as a possible
prospect. Once they have decided to take action or once they have won the bid, the real
estate  developers  need to  convince  both banks  to  back their  programme,  and,  most
importantly, investors. Those investors may be end users (the owner lives in the housing
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unit or works in the office space). They may also be individuals or corporations seeking a
safe way to invest their savings – they are looking for a profitable investment. When
trying to convince their bank, the real estate developers build their case by presenting
the potential of the area, and, more importantly, the percentage of the building that is
already sold to  end-users  or  investors.  The highest  the percentage is,  the  safest  the
programme is; but the riskiest the area is, the highest the required percentage of units
sold in advance is. According to whom they are negotiating with, real estate developers
will put forward different sides of the HSR station and adapt their argumentation to the
demands of the person they are speaking to: accessibility and urbanity or centrality of the
area  when  talking  to  end-users,  the  TGV  brand  when  trying  to  convince  (foreign)
investors.  The HSR station is  then necessary –  but  not  sufficient  –  to convince each
stakeholder to come and buy a piece of the property programme. More precisely, each
aspect of the HSR station (and its area) would not be sufficient alone to convince them: it
is the combination in the same place of material and immaterial assets, of connectivity,
centrality,  urbanity  and  branding  effect  that  makes  the  whole  property  programme
possible.
45 Last  but  not  least,  this  wide  array  of  assets  is  reinforced  by  the  action  of  public
stakeholders: prior to any real estate developer action, the HSR station helps to focus
local  public  action  on  a  deprived  area,  where  elected  officials  decide  to  launch  an
ambitious project, even a mega-project (Figure 4). This public frame adds another layer of
security  to  the  property  programmes  that  are  proposed  in  that  development  zone,
especially when public authorities are backed by state agencies providing money and
technical assistance, such as the EPA in Saint-Etienne.
46 The  HSR  station  is  thus  crucial  to  engage  private  driven  action  in  risky  cities  by
contributing to overcome each sticking point in the process of constructing a building. In
other words, it plays a major role thanks to an accumulation of minor successes built
upon the HSR station’s material and immaterial assets, playing both on short and long
terms. To some extent, this efficiency eventually relies on the (good) image spread by
opinion leaders in the financial world.
 
Conclusion: Real estate development around an HSR
station: a “cautious-man principle” or a self-fulfilling
prophecy in shrinking cities?
47 The key results of this research work highlight the variety of arguments that can attract
real-estate developers to engage in a programme next to any HSR station. First, the node-
place model (Bertolini, 1996) of the HSR station provides a wide array of assets – national
to local accessibility, centrality, urbanity, and large plots of lands. Since those various
aspects are inextricably linked to the nature of the central HSR station, the HSR station
has more value as a whole than the simple sum of every feature alone. This explains why
the HSR station as a whole is a risk-limiting asset in a project, even in a city that has a
weak market. Aware of this potential uses, real-estate developers thus consider investing
near an HSR station as in accordance with the “cautious-man” principle43:  it  helps to
equalize the risk taken when engaging in a programme in a city with a poor reputation as
Saint-Etienne.
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48 Second, if we take seriously the real estate developers unanimous statement according to
which “if there is no HSR station, they won’t come”, we understand that the HSR station
literally becomes a trigger point to engage in action in a shrinking city. It helps to reach a
key turning point in the public and private efforts to develop a place. As the developer
has to convince many stakeholders, he uses the HSR station as a resource to find the most
relevant argument to get the person’s agreement. As such, the HSR station does a little bit
more than just “magnifying existing trends” in terms of local development, as it is often
put  forward  (cf.  Offner,  2014):  it  actually  allows  to  revert  the  trend  thanks  to  the
accumulation of small steps (small trigger points) that contribute to overcoming each
sticking point in the process of constructing a new property programme in a supposedly
risky place. It eventually allows bringing some cities (or at least some districts) back in
the market, provided some snow-ball effect occurs: when a programme has proven to be
profitable next to the HSR station, real-estate developers come back and routinize their
action. This capacity to break the vicious circle of a bad economic situation – and of a bad
reputation – is built upon a voluntarist discourse of the public stakeholders, who not only
align with private stakeholders expectations, but also enhance the stability of the place.
In a way, this might be read as a shared self-fulfilling prophecy 44 (Merton, 1948): even if
there  are  no  proven  structuring  effects  of  the  HSR  station,  public  and  private
stakeholders still believe there are some and thus focus their action and investment in
that one place.
49 But  the  Châteaucreux  case  study  clearly  shows  that  this  trigger-point  role  is  still
influenced – if not determined – by the general context. The HSR was not sufficient to
spur action in the 1980s when the city was facing many difficulties. It became a necessity
to use it as an argument two decades later, not the city to be left behind in the context of
urban competition, when the HSR became a consensually acclaimed and highly desirable
feature, and when other cities were accordingly playing the HSR card.
50 Third, the fact that many of the real-estate developers are embedded in the financial
world and have to comply with strict risk-limiting rules leads to question the city, or the
piece of city that is actually produced. If the HSR station was actually a trigger point to
enable new buildings to be built, we can wonder to which extent this offer – somewhat
standardised – will meet the local needs in the long run. A deeper analysis of the use of
those buildings over time (rate of occupancy, turn over, type of end-user…) would help to
assess the relevance of using the HSR as a trigger point in shrinking cities. To which
extent is this market-led and seemingly effective in the short term strategy somewhat
artificial and short-sighted in the long term?
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NOTES
1. In French, “un projet de territoire”: this phrase describes an urban or a regional development
plan, which also aims at strengthening the sense of place.
2. Laboratoire  d’Economie  des  Transports  (LET)  is  a  research  unit  based  in  Lyons  which  is
specialised  in  transport  economics.  Researchers  working  there  monitored  the  effects  of  the
creation of an HSR service between Lyons and Paris.
3. However, their recent survey reveals that the HSR is still not the number one location factor
for private companies, but that it actually climbed up the hierarchy of location factors in only a
few years (Bazin et al, 2016).
4. Th. Theurillat refers to the anchoring of the capital in a local context thanks to a twofold
negotiation led by the developers:  with the global  investors on the one hand,  with the local
society on the other hand (Theurillat, 2011).
5. In the real estate world, a “prime” location is defined by its accessibility (by road, by mass
transit) and the quality of the building (new, modern, convenient and up-to-date design).
6. Which reveals a new trend in office buildings’ location: historically located in city centres,
office buildings moved to peripheral urban areas in the 1990s (Crouzet, 2001). They are now back
in city centres, not in the historical core but in new business districts, often in the vicinity of a
central train station.
7. Historically, the image of central station areas is twofold: modernity and marginality. At the
time stations were built, steel frame and glass walls were fine examples of the most advanced
techniques.  But  train  stations  soon  became  the  focal  point  of  an  underworld  (traffics,
prostitution),  hence a  bad reputation attached to most  of  train station areas in French (and
European) major cities.
8. Max  Rousseau  defines  a  “loser/losing  city”  as  a  city  suffering  from  both  objective  (high
unemployment  rate,  poverty…)  and  subjective  (bad  image  spread  by  opinion  leaders  and
prescribers) difficulties.
9. Train à Grande Vitesse – literally “high-speed train”. The first TGV service was inaugurated in
1981; it linked Paris to Lyons in two hours, instead of four hours on a regular train. As it was a
great  success,  the  high  speed  network  was  expanded  to  Lille  and  Brittany  in  the  1990s,  to
Marseille in the early 2000s and to the eastern part of France in the late 2000s. But the French
“TGV” is also able to run on regular tracks.
10. The TGV service to Châteaucreux station was actually a kind of favour to the then French
Minister of Transportation who was born and raised in Saint-Etienne. As a consequence, Saint-
Etienne differs from many cities that strove hard to get an HSR stop along a new high speed line
under construction.
11. Cirmad Grand Sud (Bouygues), Altarea Cogedim, Art de Construire, BNP Paribas Real Estate
and XXL-Ateliers. The interviews were conducted between January 2010 and March 2012.
12. Interviewing  a  real  estate  developer  means  getting  access  to  the  opinion of  the  various
people he is in touch with. It is then a good way to make up with the difficulty to reach some
private stakeholders, such as private investors or the numerous end-users.
13. I interviewed the head of Nexity Villes et Projets (2009); the head of Bouwfonds Marignan
Lyons  (2011);  the  former  head  of  the  professional  organisation  of  developers  and  builders  (
Fédération nationale des Promoteurs Constructeurs) in 2010. I also interviewed four real estate agents
in  Saint-Etienne,  one  of  them  being  a  specialist  of  tertiary  real  estate  in  the  region  (GIT-
Immobilier).
14. Especially  the  website  of  the  public  agency  in  charge  of  the  regeneration  of  the  area  –
Etablissement Public d’Aménagement de Saint-Etienne: http://www.epase.fr/fr/Projets-urbains/
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Chateaucreux/Presentation and  the  website  targeting  private  investors  in  office  buildings:
http://saint-etienne-chateaucreux.fr/.
15. 199 396 inhabitants in 1990, 180 438 in 1999.There used to be 223 223 inhabitants in Saint-
Etienne in 1968. Source: Population Census – INSEE (French Census Bureau).
16. In 2008, the rate of unemployment was as high as 15,7% in Saint-Etienne when it reached
11,6% in France. The households’ average income was 19 193 euros in Saint-Etienne when it was
23 242 euros in France. The situation was even worst in the Châteaucreux ward (15 285 euros).
Source: Population Census, 2008 – INSEE.
17. This might be read as a commonplace strategy implemented in the 2000s by many cities
facing deindustrialization (Florida, 2002). But in Saint-Etienne, this turn is also built upon a very
broad definition of design (Cunningham-Sabot, Roth, 2014) and a genuine local industrial legacy
and tradition in innovation. The City actually tried to turn traditional local skills of industrial
design  into  more  up-to-date  design  industry.  For  example,  the  School  of  Architecture  was
renamed “School of Architecture and design” to record that move. As a token of this turn, Saint-
Etienne was the first French city to belong to the UNESCO Creative Cities Network (2010). But this
strategy is problematic given the limited local resources of Saint-Etienne, compared to other
“creative cities” that are at least regional capitals (Cunningham-Sabot, Roth, 2014).
18. A « Zone d’Aménagement Concerté » (ZAC) is a comprehensive planning area defined by local
public authorities where specific rules and taxes apply.  It  is  thought to be a lever for urban
planning.
19. The « Établissement Public d’Aménagement de Saint-Etienne » (EPASE) was created by the
Central State in 2007, at the request of the Mayor. This public planning agency brings technical
expertise and public money (2007-2014: 120 M €; 2015-2020: 80 M €; half of that money comes
from the Central State, half of it comes from local authorities) to carry on the urban regeneration
of Saint-Etienne. Five areas were set to focus action in the city, among which Châteaucreux. The
creation of such an agency is “something exceptional, reserved for spaces with big challenges; it
demonstrates the importance the State is  giving to Saint-Etienne’s  evolution.” (Cunningham-
Sabot, Roth, 2014, p 112).
20. Source: L’Express n°3034, 27 août-02 septembre 2009. A French magazine, L’Express publishes
annual real estate figures based on the PERVAL official database. According to the real estate
agent who is interviewed in this article, the 2008 crisis did not lead to a significant price drop (-
0,3%) as the prices were already very low compared to other cities. However, the 2008 crisis lead
to a significant drop in the volume of the housing units being sold (-20%), as the owners would
rather not sell than cut an already low price.
21. Source: Le Nouvel Observateur, n°2338, 27 août-02 septembre 2009.
22. 10,4% in Saint-Etienne in 2008 (12,7% in the Châteaucreux district); 6,3% in Region Rhône-
Alpes, 6,7% in France (source: INSEE).
23. This  is  still  true in 2015,  cf.  the figures regularly updated by this  nationwide real  estate
agency:  http://www.efficity.com/prix-immobiliers/france_z111161/#6.00/46.907/1.662.  Saint-
Etienne appears in green, corresponding to the lowest range of prices.
24. Source: GIT Immobilier, a local real estate agency specialized in commercial properties that
publishes annual reports on the real estate market of office buildings in the Saint-Etienne region.
I also interviewed its sales manager in 2011.
25. Source: Saint-Etienne: GIT; Lyons and Grenoble: CBRE, 2011, available at http://www.cbre.eu/
portal/pls/portal/res_rep.show_report?report_id=542.
26. Source:  EPASE,  based  upon  CBRE,  DTZ  and  Keops  reports  (2014).  Available  at  http://
www.epase.fr/sites/default/files/La%20cr%C3%87ativit%C3%87%20au%20service%20des%
20entreprises.pdf
27. Source: interview with the head of the Lyons agency of a major national real estate developer,
21.02.2011.
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28. This  developer  has  been particularly  involved  in  the  Confluence  regeneration  project  in
Lyons, where the Cardinal Group built one of the first buildings (namely its headquarters).
29. This implicit demand was especially strong on the Luminis programme – hence the yellow
snake-like building designed by Manuelle Gautrand (source: interviews at Altarea, 17.02.2010 and
18.02.2010).
30. As the first project failed, the EPASE had to organise a new call for tenders, won by another
team not including Jean Nouvel.
31. Source: interview 20.01.2010.
32. Cap Design was  a  47  housing unit  programme led by BNP Paribas  in  the vicinity  of  the
Imperial Arms Factory.
33. The area also qualifies for another tax exemption programme, since it is in the vicinity of a
specific urban renewal perimeter (“Quartier Politique de la Ville”), where the VAT rate is set at
5,5% (instead of 19,6%).
34. My acknowledgments go to the reviewer who highlighted that point.
35. However, since the French public procurement code prohibits any form of favouritism, this
routine may apply to the real estate developers’ strategy only.
36. The survey led in Rheims in 2014 underlines the same reassuring role of public authorities
(Bazin et al., 2016).
37. The CN-CESU (Centre National du Chèque Emploi Service Universel) is a public office building
where  a  specific  public  policy  helping  households  to  employ  other  people  in  the  caring
profession is managed at a national scale.
38. Each stakeholder I interviewed had to design his/her mental map of “the Châteaucreux area”.
Even if the analysis of a mental map is hindered by the technical ability to design, it shows that
the most detailed mental maps I got were those of Saint-Etienne native stakeholders.
39. Source: especially two administrative heads of Saint-Etienne Métropole, the intercommunal
body (28.08.2008; 19.02.2010).
40. Source: interview of a real-estate developer (18.02.2010).
41. Source: interview of a real-estate developer (02.03.2012).
42. This  is  quite  similar  to  what  has  been  shown  about  the  importance  of  words  in
communication studies: by using the same general word, and giving a different definition to the
same word, various stakeholders can circumvent their initial misunderstanding and eventually
make a decision (Sfez, 1973).
43. As heard during a semi-structured interview with a real estate developer in Brussels.
44. The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a
new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true (Merton, 1948, p. 195).
ABSTRACTS
Based upon a case-study in a post-industrial city (Saint-Etienne, France), this paper discusses the
relationship between a central high-speed rail (HSR) station and urban regeneration in shrinking
cities. Thanks to a qualitative approach, it analyses what precisely in an HSR station is attractive
to real estate developers in a reputedly unattractive city. The outcome of this survey is that the
HSR station is a multi-facetted asset that helps to convince every private stakeholder the real
estate developer has to deal  with.  The central  HSR station is  a three-fold asset thanks to its
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connectivity, urbanity and centrality qualities, but also thanks to the branding effect of the HSR
itself in France. The value of the station as a whole exceeds the sum of the values of its sides. The
HSR station is then a necessary – although not sufficient – condition to engage real estate action
in cities with a poor reputation as it helps to equalize the risk taken by private stakeholders in
places they would not have considered as an option otherwise.
A partir d’une étude de cas menée dans une ville post-industrielle (Saint-Etienne, France), cet
article aborde les relations entre une gare TGV de centre-ville et les projets de renouvellement
urbain, dans les villes en décroissance. Qu’est-ce qui, précisément, dans la gare TGV, constitue un
argument propice à attirer les promoteurs immobiliers dans une ville réputée peu attractive ?
Cette enquête qualitative montre que la gare est un objet pluriel dont la multiplicité des atouts
permet d’emporter l’adhésion de chacun des acteurs privés avec lesquels les promoteurs doivent
négocier. Parmi ces qualités, celles de connexité et de contiguïté (urbanité, centralité) jouent un
rôle particulièrement important, ce à quoi s’ajoute l’image de marque positive du TGV en France.
La valeur de la gare comme un tout excède la simple somme des atouts cumulés. La gare TGV est
donc une condition nécessaire – mais non suffisante – pour engager un projet immobilier dans
des villes souffrant d’une mauvaise réputation. Elle permet une péréquation du risque pris par
les acteurs privés dans des endroits qu’ils n’auraient autrement pas prospectés.
INDEX
Keywords: central HSR station, real estate developers, urban regeneration, land value, Saint-
Etienne
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